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Abstract Runtime verification is the process of verifying critical behavioral prop-
erties in big complex systems, where formal verification is not possible due to state
space explosion. There have been several attempts to design efficient algorithms
for runtime verification. Most of these algorithms have a formally defined correct-
ness property as a reference and check whether the system consistently meets the
demands of the property or it fails to satisfy the property at some point in run-
time. LTL is a commonly used language for defining these kinds of properties and
is also the language of focus in this paper. One of the main target systems for run-
time verification are distributed systems, where the system consists of a number
of processes connecting to each other using asynchronous message passing. There
are two approaches for runtime verification in distributed systems. The first one
consists of centralized algorithms, where all processes send their events to a spe-
cific decision-making process, which keeps track of all the events to evaluate the
specified property. The second approach consists of distributed algorithms, where
processes check the specified property collaboratively. Centralized algorithms are
simple, but usually involve sending a large number of messages to the decision-
making process. They also suffer from the problem of single point of failure, as
well as high traffic loads towards one process. Distributed algorithms, on the other
hand, are usually more complicated, but once implemented, offer more efficiency.
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2 M. Ali Dorosty et al.
In this paper, we focus on a class of asynchronous distributed systems, where each
process can change its own local state at any arbitrary time and completely in-
dependent of others, while all processes share a global clock. We propose a sound
and complete algorithm for decentralized runtime verification of LTL properties
in these systems.
Keywords Runtime verification · Asynchronous distributed systems · Global
clock · LTL · Monitoring · Automaton
1 Introduction
Reliability is one of the main characteristics of new complex software used in safety-
critical systems. Many algorithms and solutions have been proposed in order to
ensure this requirement. A popular category of system analysis methods, known
as model checking [1] involve offline observation of the system’s model and checking
for possibilities of violation of the desired property. These methods are often ex-
pensive and suffer from the well-known state space explosion problem due to the
exponential growth nature of the state space in these kinds of methods. Also, we
don’t always have access to the underlying system’s model. Runtime verification [2,
3] is another category of system analysis methods, where instead of detecting the
possibility of property satisfactions/violations beforehand, they are detected them
at runtime. These methods are especially useful when formal verification methods
are not able to analyze all the possible executions of the system. Shortly speaking,
runtime verification is applicable when the goal is to analyze a complex system
for which model checking is not possible due to the state space explosion, but
the property is relatively small, and can be checked using lightweight methods at
runtime.
Most of these methods take a formally defined property, describing the correcct
behaviour of the system, as input in order to monitor the system at runtime with
respect to the given property. The goal is to determine whether the system’s
behavior would satisfy or violate the property. A commonly used language for
defining these kinds of properties is LTL [4], which is the language we focus on in
this paper. Our algorithm is designed for a class of systems known as distributed
systems[5], which usually consist of a set of processes using message passing as their
primary communication mechanism. The popularity of these types of systems has
led to demand for various algorithms defined in a distributed context, including
runtime verification algorithms. Runtime verification algorithms typically take a
property φ as input, which is the property to be checked. In distributed systems,
a common approach to solving this problem is the centralized approach, where
all processes send their data to a pre-selected process (also known as the central
monitor) that is responsible for deciding about satisfaction or violation of the
property φ. In order to reach this decision, other processes need to inform the
decision-making process about all of their local events that may result in the
satisfaction or violation of φ. This needs a high number of messages to be sent to
one process, which results in congestion in that process’s incoming channels, as
well as making that process a single-point-of-failure. In the other approach, known
as distributed algorithms, processes work collaboratively towards a common goal;
until one of them deducts and broadcasts the final result of the algorithm.
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A number of algorithms have been proposed for distributed runtime verifica-
tion. Some of them are centralized or semi-centralized algorithms [6,7], and hence,
suffer from all the previously stated problems. Some define their own property
definition languages [8,9] (which are less expressive than LTL), and some require
the system to be synchronous [10,11,12]. Falcone et al. in [13] proposed a decen-
tralized runtime verification algorithm that utilizes the global clock, similar to
our proposed algorithm. However, our algorithm is much more efficient and needs
significantly fewer messages compared to their approach.
In this paper, we propose a decentralized algorithm for runtime verification of
LTL properties. In order to utilize our method, each process must be augmented
with the same exact monitoring algorithm, the details of which will be discussed
in Sect. 4. This algorithm, which we will refer to as the monitor from now on, con-
stantly runs in parallel with the process’s main task until it detects the satisfaction
or violation of the property. It is expected that a process’s monitor can access its
entire local state atomically. All monitors take the same LTL property as input,
at the systems initialization time, and start running at the same time as their
corresponding processes. Each monitor listens for when its process experiences a
change in its local state in a way that may result in the satisfaction/violation of
the given LTL property. Monitors are expected to be able to send and receive
messages to each other. Furthermore, all monitors share a global clock, meaning
that messages can be timestamped, and the concept of “time t” has a common
meaning among different monitors. Our algorithm is sound and complete, meaning
that if one monitor reports the satisfaction/violation of φ at time t, then φ is ac-
tually satisfied/violated at t, and vice versa. In some cases multiple monitors may
arrive at the same verdict and report it together.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 some preliminary def-
initions will be given, along with some examples to provide a sense of how we
approach runtime verification. We then present our algorithm, first expressing the
problem in Sect. 3, and then describing the runtime verification algorithm in full
detail in Sect. 4, followed by a proof of its soundness and completeness in Sect. 5.
We then demonstrate our algorithm’s usefulness by showing some experimental
results in Sect. 6. In Sect. 7 we review some previous work in distributed runtime
verification, and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. Fi-
nally, we conclude by talking about the achievements of our work and discussing
future work that can be possible in Sect. 8.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we give a brief introduction to the concepts we use in our algorithm.
We will use a running example throughout the paper to clarify these concepts and
the algorithm details.
Example 1 Say we have 3 autonomous flying drones that communicate via asyn-
chronous message passing named “drone A”, “drone B” and “drone C”. The mis-
sion of all drones is getting to a specified destination. Drone A is the leader and
drones B and C are the followers. We want to verify property φ at runtime which
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is defined as:
φ ≡ At some point, the leader arrives at the destination. It
then stays there until both followers have also arrived.
In this paper, we focus on a type of distributed systems, where processes com-
municate via asynchronous message passing; if a process wants to send data to
another process, it sends that data via one or many messages to the other process.
Messages can be received arbitrarily later than the time they were sent and in
an order different from the one they were sent. Also, we rely on the existence of
a global clock that can be accessed by all the monitors. This can be done by ei-
ther reading the clock value from one physical clock, or synchronizing local clocks
of processes periodically, such that their drift at any arbitrary time is negligible.
More formally, we define a distributed system as follows:
Definition 1 (Distributed System) A distributed system S consists of a set
of processes p1, p2, . . . , pn that are connected via asynchronous message passing
channels.
Example 2 In our running example, the distributed system can be defined as
{p1, p2, p3}, where p1 is drone A, and p2 and p3 are drone B and drone C, re-
spectively.
Atomic propositions are propositional statements intrinsic to the system and
are used to specify the desired properties. The system designer who comes up with
the LTL property, has to first define a set of atomic propositions AP in the system
that are relevant to the desired property.
Let APi ⊂ AP be the subset of AP containing atomic propositions belonging
to pi. These subsets of AP are mutually disjoint: i 6= j ⇒ APi ∩APj = Ø
Example 3 In Example 1, we could define the following atomic propositions:
a ≡ Drone A (the leader) is currently at the destination.
b ≡ Drone B is currently at the destination.
c ≡ Drone C is currently at the destination.
Definition 2 (State) A state σ is a valuation of all atomic propositions in the
system (AP ). Each state is depicted with a subset of AP , indicting the atomic
propositions that are true in that state. Any atomic proposition that is not a
member of the set is false at that state. The set of all possible states of the system
is denoted by Σ = 2AP (also known as the systems alphabet). A local state of a
process pi is a valuation of the atomic propositions of pi (APi).
Note: We use the terms state and global state interchangeably throughout the
paper.
Next we move on to defining our property. LTL properties are defined on infinite
computations, which are defined as follows:
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Definition 3 (Finite/Infinite Computation) A finite/infinite sequence on the
system’s alphabet is called a finite/infinite computation (execution) of the sys-
tem. For example, ω = {σ0, σ1, σ2, . . . } is an infinite computation, and ω′ =
{σ′0, σ′1, σ′2, . . . , σ′k} is a finite computation, where for all i, σi ∈ Σ. The set of
all finite computations of a system is represented by Σ∗ and the set of all infinite
computations of a system is represented by Σω.
Example 4 Some examples of finite computations in Example 1 are as follows:
No drone has
initially reached
the destination
Drone A is at the
destination from
t = 2.1 to t = 5.2
Drones A and B
are at the
destination from
t = 5.2 to t = 9
All drones are at the
destination from
t = 9 onwards
At t = 2.1
drone A (the leader)
arrives at
the destination
At t = 5.2
drone B arrives at
the destination
At t = 9
drone C arrives at
the destination
Satisfaction
Fig. 1 A sample execution scenario resulting in the satisfaction of φ
No drone has
initially reached
the destination
Drone A is at the
destination from
t = 3.2 to t = 6.7
Drones A and B
are at the
destination from
t = 6.7 to t = 10
Only drone B is
at the destination
from t = 10
onwards
At t = 3.2
drone A (the leader)
arrives at
the destination
At t = 6.7
drone B arrives at
the destination
At t = 10
drone A (the leader)
leaves the destination
Violation
Fig. 2 A sample execution scenario resulting in the violation of φ
Note that in this example, a can only be checked by drone A, and similarly, b and
c can only be checked by drone B and drone C, respectively.
Example 5 Using states (sets of atomic propositions), the scenarios in Example 4
can be shown as:
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σ0 = {} σ1 = {a} σ2 = {a, b} σ3 = {a, b, c}
t = 2.1 t = 5.2 t = 9
Satisfaction
Fig. 3 A sample computation (σ = {{}, {a}, {a, b}, {a, b, c}}) resulting in the satisfaction of
φ
σ0 = {} σ1 = {a} σ2 = {a, b} σ3 = {b}
t = 3.2 t = 6.7 t = 10
Violation
Fig. 4 A sample computation (σ = {{}, {a}, {a, b}, {b}}) resulting in the violation of φ
Definition 4 (Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)) LTL is a popular property speci-
fication language, used to define correctness properties with the following syntax:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∨ φ | © φ | φ ∪ φ
, where p is an atomic proposition (p ∈ AP ). The semantics of LTL is based
on infinite computations of the system, and is defined as follows. Considering
ω = {σ0, σ1, σ2, . . . } ∈ Σω, the satisfaction relation (depecited with |=) is defined
as follows:
ω |= φ iff ω, σ0 |= φ
ω, σi |= p iff p ∈ σi
ω, σi |= ¬φ iff ω 6|= φ
ω, σi |= φ ∨ ψ iff (ω, σi |= φ) ∨ (ω, σi |= ψ)
ω, σi |=©φ iff σi+1 |= φ
ω, σi |= φ ∪ ψ iff ∃k ≥ i . (ω, σk |= ψ) ∧ ∀i ≤ j ≤ k . (ω, σj |= φ)
Temporal operators  and ♦ can also be defined as follows:
♦φ = > ∪ φ
φ = ¬(♦¬φ)
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The semantics of LTL is defined based on infinite computations and cannot be
used in the context of runtime verification, as in that case, we are dealing with
finite computations. Therefore a finite variant of this language has been proposed,
called LTL3 [14], the semantics of which is defined on finite computations. The
syntax of LTL3 is exactly the same as LTL, but its semantics is different.
Definition 5 (LTL3 (3-valued LTL)) LTL3, also known as 3-valued LTL is very
similar to LTL, with slightly different semantics. The evaluation of an LTL3 prop-
erty φ on a finite computation η ∈ Σ∗ is defined below. Note that the dot operator
implies concatenation, and |= used in this definition is already defined in Defini-
tion 4.
[η |= φ] ≡

> iff ∀ω ∈ Σω : (η.ω |= φ)
⊥ iff ∀ω ∈ Σω : (η.ω 6|= φ)
? otherwise
In other words, a finite computation satisfies (violates) an LTL3 property, iff for all
extensions of that computation to an infinite one, the corresponding LTL property
is satisfied (violated). Otherwise the property is evaluated to unknown (denoted by
?). Simply speaking, LTL is intended for offline verification of the system and re-
sults in a value in {>,⊥} where > means true/satisfied and ⊥ means false/violated.
LTL3, on the other hand, is intended to be evaluated at runtime on finite compu-
tations and may be evaluated to unknown as well.
Example 6 In Example 1, φ can be defined as: φ = ¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b ∧ c)) as an LTL3
formula.
Some properties like “Drone B arrives at the destination and leaves it infi-
nately often” cannot be checked using runtime verification. These properties are
also refered to as non-monitorable properties. Their counterparts, also refered to
as monitorable properties, are the types of properties that can benefit from our
algorithm.
Definition 6 (Good/Bad Prefix) For a computation ω = {σ0, σ1, σ2, . . . }, and a
given property φ, the prefix ω′ = {σ0, σ1, . . . , σk} is a good/bad prefix if it results
in the satisfaction/violation of φ.
(Non-)Monitorable properties are formally defined as follows:
Definition 7 ((Non-)Monitorable property) An LTL property φ is monitorable/non-
monitorable iff there exists/doesn’t exist a computation ω containing a good or
bad prefix of φ.
Monitorable properties are convertable to a specific DFA (deterministic finite
automaton), which can be used in runtime verification. How to convert an LTL
property to its corresponding automaton is described in detail in [14,15]. In the
following examples, we show how this automaton is useful.
Definition 8 (Monitor Automaton) For a monitorable LTL property φ, the
monitor automaton Mφ = {Q,Q0, R, L} is a unique deterministic finite automaton
(DFA), where:
– Q is a set of locations,
– Q0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial locations,
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– R ⊆ Q× 2Σ ×Q is a transition relation on the set of locations, and
– L : Q 7→ {>,⊥, ?} is a labeling function that shows whether the location is
accepting (>), rejecting (⊥), or unknown (?).
For every finite computation η that satisfies/violates φ, the run of Mφ on η
terminates in a location labeled >/⊥, and for every computation η that neither
satisfies nor violates φ, the run terminates in a location that is labeled ? by the L
function. For simplicity, the label of each transition is depicted by a predicate in
propositional logic, which represents a subset of Σ, containing elements that can
each enable the transition.
Example 7 The monitor automaton for the LTL property φ = ¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b ∧ c)) is
depicted in Fig. 5 (> and ⊥ mean true and false respectively and are used to show
satisfying/violating states):
q0start q1
q>
q⊥
¬a ∧ ¬(b ∧ c)
a ∧ ¬(b ∧ c)
b ∧ c
a ∧ ¬(b ∧ c)
b ∧ c
¬a ∧ ¬(b ∧ c)
true
true
Fig. 5 The monitor automaton for the LTL property φ = ¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b ∧ c))
A monitor automaton is deterministic, which means that for any location q ∈ Q
and any σ ∈ Σ, there exists q′ ∈ Q such that (q, σ, q′) ∈ R and ∀q′′ ∈ Q : (q, p, q′′) ∈
R⇒ q′′ = q′. Simply speaking, at each point in time, one and exactly one transition
is enabled (including self-loops).
Example 8 Following Examples 4 and 5, we can show the changes in the locations
of the corresponding monitor automation (Fig. 5) in Figs. 6 and 7, where the
bottom braces show the current location of the automaton. Starting at state q0,
each time a transition is enabled based on the system’s global state, the current
location changes to the succeeding location accordingly.
Decentralized Runtime Verification for LTL Properties Using Global Clock 9
{} {a} {a, b} {a, b, c}
t = 2.1
a ∧ ¬(b ∧ c)
t = 5.2
[self-loop]
t = 9
b ∧ c
Satisfaction
q0 q1 q>
Fig. 6 A sample execution scenario resulting in the satisfaction of φ
{} {a} {a, b} {b}
t = 3.2
a ∧ ¬(b ∧ c)
t = 6.7
[self-loop]
t = 10
¬a ∧ ¬(b ∧ c)
Violation
q0 q1 q⊥
Fig. 7 A sample execution scenario resulting in the violation of φ
Essentially, we need to present a decentralized algorithm that detects the lo-
cation changes in the monitor automaton by monitoring changes in the system’s
global state. For simplicity, we modify the automaton by first removing self-loops
and then replacing the transition predicates with their corresponding Disjunctive
Normal Form (DNF).
q0start q1
q>
q⊥
(a ∧ ¬b)∨
(a ∧ ¬c)
b ∧ c
b ∧ c
(¬a ∧ ¬b)∨
(¬a ∧ ¬c)
Fig. 8 The modified monitor automaton for the LTL property φ = ¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b ∧ c))
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We further modify the automaton by breaking transitions into multiple transi-
tions, each containing one conjunct from the DNF form of the transition predicate.
We also label each transition by Tri.
q0start q1
q>
q⊥
Tr0 = a ∧ ¬b
Tr1 = a ∧ ¬c
Tr2 = b ∧ c
Tr3 = b ∧ c
Tr4 = ¬a ∧ ¬b
Tr5 = ¬a ∧ ¬c
Fig. 9 The final monitor automaton for the LTL property φ = ¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b ∧ c))
The automaton depicted in Fig. 9 is what we would be using throughout our
monitoring algorithm; at each point in time, the whole system is at one of the
automaton locations {q0, q1, q>, q⊥}. Note that in a scenario where our monitor
automaton location is q0, and the system’s global state is {a}, then both Tr0
and Tr1 would be enabled. A similar scenario could be shown for Tr4 and Tr5
where the monitor automaton location is q1, and the system’s global state is {},
however in all these cases, because of the automaton’s deterministic nature, all the
transitions arrive at the same succeeding location, and hence, it doesn’t matter
whether for example, Tr0 gets enabled before Tr1, or vice versa.
3 Problem Statement
We take as input:
1. a distributed system S, consisting of n processes, {p1, p2, p3, . . . , pn} sharing a
global clock and connecting via asynchronous message passing, and
2. an LTL property φ.
We propose an algorithm for a local monitor mi for each process pi to monitor φ
on S, such that its violation or satisfaction is detected by at least one process. The
same exact algorithm would be run as each process’s monitor. The only differen-
tiating factors between mi’s is the set of local variables that they can read, which
belongs to the process pi. We assume that there is a message channel between
each pair of processes, and if a message is sent, it will be received by its intended
receiver in finite time and not get dropped, corrupted or tampered with.
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4 Decentralized algorithm
In this section, we will present our decentralized algorithm for runtime verification
in detail. The algorithm takes an LTL property as input. The property’s monitor
automaton is initially constructed offline, having states {q0, q1, q2, . . . }, and tran-
sitions {Tr1, T r2, T r3, . . . }, each having an expression as its predicate, which is a
propositional conjunction of atomic propositions. Each process keeps a copy of this
automaton.
Note: From this point in the paper, when will use processes and their monitors
interchangeably.
The general goal of the monitoring algorithm is to trace the locations of the
monitor automaton based on the changes in the global state of the system, and
detect reaching > or ⊥ locations. For instance, in our running example, for the
computation η = {{}, {b}, {a, b}, {a}, {}}, the corresponding automaton locations
of the system are q0 for the first two letters (global states), q1 for the next ({a, b}),
and q⊥ for the last one ({}).
At each step, we want to detect the change from one automaton location to
the other. In other words, among all the outgoing transitions from the current
automaton location, we want to detect the one that gets enabled the earliest.
4.1 Detecting enabling time of transitions
Each process stores the current automaton location (qcurrent, or qc for short). Ini-
tially, this location is the initial automaton location (q0). Each time a process de-
tects the location change, it updates its own qc and moves on to the next step. The
last location change time is also stored by each process in its tlast location change
(or tllc for short) value, which is initially zero. Note that location changes may be
detected with a slight delay, for example, if at t = 7 the system arrives at a new
automaton location, this fact may remain undetected for 2 seconds until at t = 9
one of the processes realizes that at t = 7 a transition was enabled (and it was
the earliest among the others) resulting in an automaton location change. That
process then lets the others know about this location change.
In order to detect a transitions enabling time, the truthfulness of its predicate
must be monitored. Each process may have one or more literals in a predicate.
If, for example, a transition’s predicate is (¬a1 ∧ a2 ∧ ¬b), and a1 and a2 are only
accessible by process p1, and b is only accessible by process p2, then ¬a1 and a2 are
the literals of process p1, and ¬b is the literal of process p2. Given that assumption,
if a1 = true and a2 = false, we say p1’s literals are satisfied, and also if b = false,
we say p2’s literals are satisfied. Therefore, a transition becomes enabled when for
each process associated with the transition’s predicate, all the process’s literals get
satisfied.
At each step, for each outgoing transition of qc, all processes associated with the
transition’s predicate are responsible for detecting if and when it becomes enabled.
Each of these processes records a history of when its literals were satisfied from
tllc until now. This history is stored as a set of positive intervals and we call it the
satisfaction range of that process for that transition, or sr for short. For example,
sr = [3, 4] ∪ [5, 6] indicates that at all times between t = 3 and t = 4, and also at
all times between t = 5 and t = 6, all the process’s literals were satisfied for the
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transition. Each process keeps its sr up to date for all transitions whose predicates
it is associated with.
As stated previously, in order for a transition to become enabled, the literals
for all the processes associated with its predicate must be satisfied, and hence,
a process can not make this decision on its own. Therefore, each process must
keep the values of sr for all the other processes associated with the transition’s
predicate. To this end, for each outgoing transition of qc, if a process is associated
with the transition’s predicate, it stores the set {sr1, sr2, sr3, . . . , srk}, containing
the values of sr for all the k processes associated with the transition’s predicate,
including itself. However, we know that a process doesn’t have access to the value
of other process’s sr; so, processes must somehow send their sr values to each
other. If a process realizes that global satisfaction range = sr1 ∩ sr2 ∩ sr3 ∩ · · · ∩ srk
is not empty, then it can conclude that the transition was enabled at the smallest
time in global satisfaction range, or gsr for short. In other words, if gsr 6= Ø then
min(gsr) is the transition’s enabling time.
In order for the values of sr to be shared among the processes associated
with all transitions’ predicates, each transition has a coordinator process. At the
beginning of each step, for each outgoing transition of qc a process is chosen to
be its coordinator. The values of sr for all processes are also set to zero at the
beginning of a step. Whenever the coordinator realizes that one or more of its own
literals are not satisfied in the transition at some points in time, it can conclude
that the transition was definitely not enabled in those times, due to the transition’s
predicate being a conjunction of literals. However, when all of the coordinator’s
literals are satisfied, other processes must be consulted in the decision making, so
the coordinator sends a Delegate message to another process associated with the
transition’s predicate. This message is structured as follows:
〈Delegate, tllc, T r, {sr1, sr2, sr3, . . . , srk}〉
Tr in this message is the transition whose satisfaction is being determined, and
the value of each sri is the last value of sr for pi that the coordinator knows of.
The value of tllc is included in every message of any kind. It acts as a timestamp to
allow us to distinguish between messages belonging to different steps; if a process
receives a message with a smaller tllc than its own, it concludes that the message
belongs to a previous step and is of no value, and hence, it is dropped by the
process. If the message’s tllc is greater than of the process, it means that the
process is lagging behind other processes, and hence, it resets itself, updates its
tllc, processes the message, and from then after, waits for messages with the new
value of tllc.
Upon receiving a Delegate message, the receiving process becomes the new
coordinator of the transition and the previous coordinator that sent the message
no longer considers itself the coordinator of that transition. After receiving the
message, the new coordinator updates its values of sr belonging to other processes,
to the corresponding values provided in the message. It then checks if an enabling
time can be detected for the transition, just like the previous coordinator used
to do. Hence, the coordination role keeps getting delegated between processes.
The processes keep sharing their values of sr with each other until one of them
detects the transition’s enabling time (if it ever becomes enabled). After detecting
a transition’s enabling time, the transition’s coordinator will not send a Delegate
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message to the other processes in that transition, until the end of that step. Note
that if a process is associated with the predicate of multiple outgoing transitions
of qc, it may become the coordinator of multiple transitions; so a process may be
the coordinator of more than one transition at each point in time.
If a process detects that, for example, transition Tri was enabled at a cer-
tain time, that does not mean that Tri was the earliest transition to become
enabled; another transition Trj may exist with a smaller enabling time than Tri.
Therefore, processes must check all outgoing transitions and determine which of
them gets enabled at the earliest time. To this end, each process keeps a list
called transitions checked, or TrC for short, containing outgoing transitions it has
checked so far. At the beginning of each step, this list is empty for all processes,
and each time a process detects the enabling time of a transition, it adds that
transition to its TrC list. Each process also keeps track of the earliest transition
that it has detected so far; the first time that a process detects a transition be-
coming enabled, it keeps that transition in its Trearliest value (Tre for short), and
it keeps the transition’s enabling time in its tTre value. From then after, whenever
the process detects the enabling time of another transition, it adds that transition
to TrC and compares its enabling time to tTre ; if the enabling time was smaller,
the process updates its values of Tre and tTre .
A transition may become enabled a long time after others (or not become
enabled at all). For these transitions, it suffices for processes to detect that they
won’t be enabled earlier than their Tre; if the lower bound of a transition’s enabling
time is greater than a process’s tTre , that process can be certain that the transition
will never replace its Tre. To have a lower bound for a transition’s enabling time,
we introduce a transition’s last update time, denoted by tlast updated by pi , or tlui
for short. Each process keeps the last time it has received a Delegate message from
each process pi as its tlui value. The minimum of all tluis is the lower bound of the
transitions enabling time, since all the processes associated with the transition’s
predicate have updated the sr value before that time, and if the transition was
enabled before then, it would have been noticed. The set of all of a process’s tlu
values is sent with each Delegate message; so the structure of a Delegate message
is as follows:
〈Delegate, tllc, T r, {sr1, sr2, sr3, . . . , srk}, {tlu1 , tlu2 , tlu3 , . . . , tluk}〉
Upon receiving a Delegate message, the next coordinator updates its own tlu values
to the ones in the message. If after updating all its sr and tlu values, it still can’t
detect the Tr’s enabling time, it checks if min({tlu1 , tlu2 , tlu3 , . . . , tluk}) < tTre ; if
so, it means that Tr was not enabled before Tre, therefore the process adds Tr to
its TrC and no longer sends a Delegate message for Tr. Essentially, TrC is the list
of all transitions that have been checked and were not enabled earlier than tTre .
The values of tlu can also be used to determine the next coordinator process.
More accurately, the process pj with the smallest value for tluj is selected, as it
has sent its Delegate message before the others and is the least up-to-date one. tlu
values can also be used in a way that we no longer need to store an sr value for
each process. We can keep a global potential satisfaction range value, or gpsr for
short, containing times when the transition could have been enabled. This value
has the following relationship with sr and tlu values:
gpsr = (sr1 ∪ (tlu1 ,∞))∩ (sr2 ∪ (tlu2 ,∞))∩ (sr3 ∪ (tlu3 ,∞))∩ · · · ∩ (srk ∪ (tluk ,∞))
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So gpsr is similar to sr, except that we make the optimistic assumption that the
literals of each other process are satisfied from that process’s tlu (the last time we
know about that processes literals) onward. At the start of each step the value of
gpsr is [0,∞) in each process for each transition. The coordinator keeps the value
of gpsr up-to-date by removing the times when one or more of their literals were
not satisfied from gpsr. At each point in time, if gpsr is not empty and min(gpsr)
is smaller than all the tlu values, then t = min(gpsr) is the enabling time of the
transition; this can be proven as follows:
gsr =
k⋂
i=1
(sri) =
k⋂
i=1
((sr1 ∪ (tlu1 ,∞)) ∩ [0, tlu1 ]) = gpsr ∩
k⋂
i=1
[0, tlui ]
⇒ gsr = gpsr ∩ [0,min({tlu1 , tlu2 , tlu3 , . . . , tluk})]
The enabling time for the transition is the minimum of gsr values, which based on
the equation above, is also the minimum of gpsr values, given that this minimum
is smaller than all values of tlu. If t = min(gpsr) was greater than one or more tlu
values, it means that the transition may have become enabled but we lack data
from the corresponding processes of those tlu values. Therefore, the coordinator
sends a Delegate message to the next coordinator which has the smallest tlu, which
is among those ambiguous processes.
Having the values gpsr and tlu of all the processes associated with the transi-
tion, we do not need to send sr values with Delegate messages, so the final form
of Delegate messages, which is used in the algorithm is structured as below:
〈Delegate, tllc, T r, gpsr, {tlu1 , tlu2 , tlu3 , . . . , tluk}〉
Example 9 Consider a distributed system including processes {p1, p2, p3, p4} with
AP1 = {a}, AP2 = {b}, AP3 = {c}, and AP4 = {d}. Assume that we want to
detect the enabling time of a transition Tr with predicate a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d.
Fig. 10 shows a hypothetical timeline where the horizontal highlighted boxes
indicate the intervals when each atomic proposition gets true and vertical striped
areas represent time ranges where a∧ b∧ c∧d = true: [16, 18) and [19, 20). We only
care about the first time point in these ranges, as it is the enabling time of the
transition.
Fig. 10 An example of a timeline showing the intervals that each atomic proposition gets
true
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A sample execution of the transition monitoring part of our algorithm is depicted
below:
– Initially, the values of a, b, c and d are false, and p1 is the coordinator of the
transition.
– At t = 5, a becomes true in process p1. As a result, p1 sends a Delegate message
to p2 with gpsr = {5} and tlu1 = 5.
– At t = 6, p2 receives the Delegate message and updates its gpsr to {} (since b
is false at t = 5). It also updates its tlu1 to 5, and its tlu2 to 6.
– At t = 8, b becomes true and p2 sends a Delegate message to p3 with gpsr = {8},
tlu1 = 5, and tlu2 = 8.
– At t = 9, p3 receives the message and sets its gpsr to [8, 9], its tlu1 to 5, its
tlu2 to 8, and its tlu3 to 9. It then sends a Delegate message containing these
values to p4.
– At t = 10, p4 receives the message, sets its gpsr to [9, 10], its tlu1 to 5, its tlu2 to
8, its tlu3 to 9, and its tlu4 to 10. It then sends a Delegate message containing
these values to p1.
– At t = 11, p1 receives the message, sets its gpsr to {}, its tlu1 to 11, its tlu2 to
8, its tlu3 to 9, and its tlu4 to 10.
– At t = 16, a becomes true, so p1 updates its tlu1 to 16, and its gpsr to {16}. It
then sends a Delegate message to p2.
– At t = 16, p2 receives the message, sets its gpsr to [16, 19], its tlu1 to 16, its
tlu2 to 19, its tlu3 to 9, and its tlu4 to 10. It then sends a Delegate message to
p3.
– At t = 20, p3 receives the message, sets its gpsr to [16, 18] ∪ [19, 20], its tlu1
to 16, its tlu2 to 19, its tlu3 to 20, and its tlu4 to 10. It then sends a Delegate
message to p4.
– At t = 22, p4 receives the message, sets its gpsr to [16, 18] ∪ [19, 21], its tlu1 to
16, its tlu2 to 19, its tlu3 to 20, and its tlu4 to 22. It then announces t = 16 as
the transition’s enabling time.
4.2 Issues Regarding Completeness
As stated previously, processes detect the enabling times of transitions by sending
Delegate messages to each other. They then add these transitions, along with other
transitions that have been proven not to become enabled before others, to their
TrC list. Whenever a process arrives at a state where its TrC contains all outgoing
transitions of qc, then its Tre is the earliest transition and that transition’s target
location is the next automaton location. The process informs the other processes of
this location change and the next step starts. One problem is that some transitions
may never get added to a process’s TrC using the previously described methods.
These transitions are present in one of the following scenarios:
1. Consider the outgoing transitions of qc to be Tr1 with predicate a∧ b, and Tr2
with predicate c∧ d, where a, b, c, and d are literals belonging to four different
processes. The two processes that own a and b only communicate with each
other about Tr1, since they are not associated with Tr2’s predicate, therefore
by only sending and receiving Delegate messages, they will never be able to
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add Tr2 to their TrC lists. The same is true for the two processes that own c
and d, and transition Tr1.
2. Consider the outgoing transitions of qc to be Tr1 with predicate a∧ b, and Tr2
with predicate a ∧ c, where a, b and c are literals belonging to p1, p2, and p3,
respectively. Assume t = 5 is detected as Tr1’s enabling time by p1. If p3 is
currently the coordinator of Tr2, and if c never gets satisfied (c is always equal
to false), p3 never sends a Delegate message to p1, since its gpsr = Ø. This
is while p1 only needs to know that Tr2 never gets enabled before t = 5 in
order to add it to its TrC and come to the conclusion that Tr1 is the earliest
transition.
In order to fix the aforementioned problem, we introduce a new kind of mes-
sage called Aggregate. Whenever a process pi’s TrC list gets updated, it sends an
Aggregate message, containing its TrC, Tre and tTre , to processes that need in-
formation about transitions that have been checked. These receiving processes are
defined in the next paragraph. Intuitively speaking, the receiving processes pass
the list of checked transitions to other processes via Aggregate messages, until all
the processes that need to know about the transitions checked so far are notified.
Having TrC′ be the list of qc’s outgoing transitions that are not members of
pi’s TrC, pi sends this message to processes with at least one of the following
conditions:
1. Are associated with a transition in TrC′, the predicate of which pi is not
associated with,
2. Are associated with a transition in TrC′, the predicate of which pi is associated
with, and their tlu in pi is smaller than pi’s tTre .
Aggregate message have the following structure:
〈Aggregate, tllc, T rC, Tre, tTre〉
When a process receives an Aggregate message, it compares the message’s tTre
to its own tTre , and if the message’s tTre is smaller than its own tTre , then it
updates its Tre and tTre to the ones of the received Aggregate message. It also
adds the transitions in the received message’s TrC to its own TrC list. If, as a
result, its TrC list changes, and its new TrC still does not contain all outgoing
transitions of qc, it sends an Aggregate message to other processes that have one
of the previously mentioned conditions. Otherwise, it announces an automaton
location change.
4.3 Automaton Location Change
When a process realizes a location change in an automaton, it notifies the coor-
dinators of the outgoing transitions of the next automaton location. The initial
coordinator of each transition is the process with the smallest index; for example,
for a transition with a predicate involving p1, p2 and p3 in it, process p1 is chosen
as the coordinator. This criteria can be changed arbitrarily, but the important
point is that all processes should have the same criteria for this choice, so that if
more than one process notices this change at the same time, different coordina-
tors are not notified for the same transition. Upon receiving the notification, the
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next chosen coordinator processes reset all their values and then next step of the
algorithm starts.
A concurrency issue may occur, where more than one process realizes the lo-
cation change, and they all send messages to the next coordinators. In this case,
a coordinator may receive the notification message, delegate its role to another
process, and receive another notification again from another process. This can
trivially be fixed if the receiving coordinator process ignores the second notifica-
tion message with the same tllc value as the previous one.
4.4 Algorithm Overview
A general overview of the algorithm is provided as pseudo-code in Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 (where i is the index of the process that the algorithm is running
on).
Algorithm 1 shows the routines that are run whenever a message is received by
another monitor, and whenever pi’s local state changes. Lines 2-3 drop the message
if it belongs to a previous step. In lines 5-15, the monitor is reset, if it discovers from
the value of tllc that a new step has begun. In lines 17-21, the process’s gpsr and
tlu values are updated in the case of receiving a Delegate message, and in lines 23-
28, TrC, Tre and tTre are updated in the case of receiving an Aggregate message.
In line 30, the UpdateMonitorState() function is called, which is responsible for
updating the monitors’ local state and sending messages if necessary. This function
is all that needs to happen when pi’s local state changes (line 34).
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Algorithm 1 Message Reception and State Change Handlers for Each Process pi
1: procedure OnReceiveMessage(m)
2: if m.tllc < tllc then
3: // drop message (do nothing)
4: else
5: if m.tllc > tllc then
6: // reset the process’s monitoring state for the new location
7: tllc ← m.tllc
8: TrC ← {}
9: Tre ← ⊥
10: tTre ← 0
11: for all Tr ∈ qc.outgoing transitions s.t. pi ∈ Tr do
12: isCoordinatorOf [Tr]← false
13: Transitions.add(Tr, gpsr = 0, tlu = [ tllc for all processes ])
14: end for
15: end if
16: TrC has changed← false
17: if m.type = Delegate then
18: Tr ← m.Tr
19: Tr.gpsr ← m.gpsr
20: Tr.lu← m.lu
21: isCoordinatorOf [Tr]← true
22: else
23: TrC ← TrC ∪m.TrC
24: TrC has changed← true
25: if m.tTre < tTre then
26: Tre ← m.Tr
27: tTre ← m.tTre
28: end if
29: end if
30: UpdateMonitorState()
31: end if
32: end procedure
33: procedure onLocalStateChange()
34: UpdateMonitorState()
35: end procedure
Algorithm 2 shows the UpdateMonitorState() function. In lines 3-4, the values
of the process’s tlu and gpsr are updated for each outgoing transition, along with
adding the transitions, the enabling times of which have been detected, to TrC in
line 7 (the RemoveUnsatisfactoryIntervals helper function removes times were at
least one if pi’s literals are not satisfied, from the given gpsr). Lines 9-12 update the
earliest outgoing transition (Tre) detected so far. Lines 17-20 add the transitions
that can’t be enabled before Tre to TrC. Lines 21-26 send Delegate messages for
the transitions which pi is the coordinator of, and also may be enabled up until
now.
If TrC is updated to contain all transitions, the algorithm will announce the
monitor location change at line 30. Lines 33-48 send Aggregate messages (in the
case of TrC being changed) to processes associated with transitions that don’t
exist in TrC and have the first (lines 36-38) or the second (lines 40-42) conditions
described previously.
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Algorithm 2 The UpdateMonitorState function
1: procedure UpdateMonitorState()
2: for all Tr ∈ qc.outgoing transitions s.t. pi ∈ Tr do
3: RemoveUnsatisfactoryIntervals(Tr.gpsr)
4: Tr.lui = now
5: if min(Tr.gpsr) < now then
6: if ∀j : (Tr.luj > min(Tr.gpsr)) then
7: Trc.add(Tr)
8: TrC has changed← false
9: if min(Tr.gpsr) < tTre then
10: Tre ← Tr
11: tTre ← min(Tr.gpsr)
12: end if
13: end if
14: end if
15: end for
16: for all Tr ∈ qc.outgoing transitions s.t. pi ∈ Tr do
17: if Tr.gpsr ∩ [0, tTre ) = Ø ∨ ∀j : (Tr.luj > tTre ) then
18: Trc.add(Tr)
19: TrC has changed← false
20: end if
21: if Tr 6∈ TrC ∧min(Tr.gpsr) < now then
22: if isCoordinatorOf [Tr] = true then
23: send 〈Delegate, tllc, r.gpsr, T r.lu〉 to pj with smallest Tr.luj
24: isCoordinatorOf [Tr]← false
25: end if
26: end if
27: end for
28: if TrC has changed = true then
29: if ∀Tr ∈ qc.outgoing transitions : Tr ∈ TrC then
30: Announce Tre as the earliest enabling transition
31: else
32: process list← {}
33: for all Tr ∈ qc.outgoing transitions do
34: if Tr /∈ TrC then
35: if pi 6∈ Tr then
36: for all pj ∈ Tr do
37: process list.add(pj)
38: end for
39: else
40: for all pj ∈ Tr s.t. luj < tTre do
41: process list.add(pj)
42: end for
43: end if
44: end if
45: end for
46: for all pj ∈ process list do
47: send 〈Aggregate, tllc, T rC, Tre, tTre 〉 to pj
48: end for
49: end if
50: end if
51: end procedure
We now give an example of the entire algorithm in practice:
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σ0 = {} σ1 = {a} σ2 = {a, b} σ3 = {a, b, c}
t = 2.1 t = 5.2 t = 9
Satisfaction
q0start q1
q>
q⊥
Tr0 = a ∧ ¬b
Tr1 = a ∧ ¬c
Tr2 = b ∧ c
Tr3 = b ∧ c
Tr4 = ¬a ∧ ¬b
Tr5 = ¬a ∧ ¬c
Example 10 Following the first scenario in Example 4, and using the automaton in
Fig. 9, at the beginning, all processes assume that the current automaton location
is q0. Say initially p1 is the coordinator of Tr0 and p3 is the coordinator of Tr1
At t = 2.1, a becomes true, and process p1 which has access to a, realizes that Tr0
can become enabled, but it doesn’t know about b yet since only p2 has access to b,
and hence, p1 sends a Delegate message to p2. The same happens for p3 and Tr1,
resulting in p3 sending a Delegate message to p1. Upon receiving the message,
p2 realizes that Tr0 was indeed enabled at t = 2.1, so it sends an Aggregate
message to p3. p1 also realizes that Tr1 was enabled at t = 2.1 after receiving p3’s
Delegate message, so it sends an Aggregate message to p2. Since both Tr0 and
Tr1 were enabled at the same time, whichever of p2 or p3 receives their Aggregate
message first detects the automaton location change from q0 to q1 at t = 2.1. Say
after detection, it picks p3, p2 and p1 as the coordinators of Tr3, Tr4 and Tr5,
respectively. After getting chosen as Tr4’s coordinator, p2 immediately sends a
Delegate message to p1, because ¬b is true at t = 2.1. Now p1 is the coordinator
for both Tr4 and Tr5.
At t = 5.2, b becomes true, but since p2, which has access to b is not a coordinator,
it doesn’t do anything and no message is sent in the system.
At t = 9, c becomes true, and hence, p3 detects that there is a possibility for
Tr3 to become enabled at t = 9. Therefore, it sends a Delegate message to p2.
Upon reception, pr2 detects that Tr3 was indeed enabled at t = 9, so it sends an
Aggregate message to p1. After receiving the message, p1 being the coordinator of
both Tr4 and Tr5 comes to the conclusion that neither can be enabled before t = 9.
Hence, it updates its automaton location to q> and announces the satisfaction of
the LTL property.
Note: The algorithm can be slightly optimized by concatenating messages with
the same destination in one message packet. For example, if pi is the coordinator
of three transitions, and at time t, its literals become unsatisfied in the first two
transitions’ predicates, and if the next coordinator of both transitions is pj , and
also if at time t, process pi realizes that the third transition is enabled at a certain
time, as a result, a single message can be sent to pj , containing the Delegate
messages for the first two transitions and the Aggregate message resulting from
the third transitions being added to pi’s TrC.
5 Algorithm Proof
This section provides the proof of the soundness and correctness of our algorithm.
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– Our algorithm is sound, meaning that if it announces the satisfaction/violation
of the LTL property at time t, the property has actually been satisfied/violated
at time t.
– Our algorithm is complete, meaning that if the LTL property gets satis-
fied/violated at time t, the algorithm will announce the property’s satisfac-
tion/violation at time t (after a finite delay time from then).
5.1 Soundness
Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that: the algorithm announces the satisfac-
tion/violation of the LTL property at time t while in reality this claim isn’t true. Based
on this assumption, at one of the steps during the algorithm’s execution, a wrong
transition is taken, or the right transition is taken at the wrong time.
1. In the case of the right transition being taken at the wrong time, if we assume
tdetected to be the time that the algorithm has detected the transition, and
tactual to be the actual time that the transition should have been taken:
tdetected 6= tactual ⇒ (tdetected > tactual) ∨ (tdetected < tactual)
– In the case of tdetected > tactual, given the fact that tdetected = min(gpsr):
tactual < min(gpsr)⇒ tactual 6∈ min(gpsr)
As stated in the algorithm description, the initial value of gpsr is [tllc,∞) at
the beginning of each step, and the only time it changes is when a process
realizes that one or more of its literals are not satisfied at particular times,
which are then removed from gpsr. Given that tactual is in the time range of
the current step, and assuming this is the first step of error, it is obvious that
tactual ∈ [tllc,∞). That means that at some point, a coordinator process
removed tactual from gpsr, because one or more of its literals were not
satisfied at that time, which contradicts the fact that the transition was
actually enabled at tactual.
– In the case of tdetected < tactual, since tactual is the earliest time the tran-
sition becomes enabled, therefore, the transition was disabled at tdetected.
Hence, one or more literals of a process pi were not satisfied at tdetected.
We know that tlui ≥ tdetected, so since pi was the coordinator at tlui , and
tllc ≤ tdetected ≤ tlui , then pi must have removed tdetected from gpsr, which
contradicts tdetected being picked by the algorithm as the transition’s en-
abling time.
2. In the case of a wrong transition being taken, in reality another transition
(which we name Tractual) must have been enabled earlier than the transition
that the algorithm has detected (which we name Trdetected). The process that
detected Trdetected as the earliest enabling transition, must have had Trdetected
as its Tre at that time, and its TrC must have contained all the outgoing
transitions of qc. If both Tractual and Trdetected were added to its TrC by an
Aggregate message, we observe the sender of the Aggregate message; eventually
we find a process that had one of the two transitions in its TrC at some point
in time, and later on, the other got added to its TrC. We previously proved
that transitions’ enabling time are never incorrectly detected, and given that
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whenever a transition gets added to TrC, its enabling time is compared to the
process’s tTre . Since Tractual is enabled earlier than Trdetected, it is impossible
for Tre to be Trdetected after the second transition is added to TrC. So this
case also contradicts our initial assumption.
5.2 Completeness
In the proof of soundness, we came to the conclusion that the earliest transitions
and their enabling time never get detected incorrectly, and the automaton location
changes detected by the algorithm are corresponding to what happens in reality.
The only case left that could violate the algorithm’s completeness, is that at some
step, the algorithm halts and doesn’t detect a location change, where in reality a
transition (which we call Trtaken) must have been enabled and taken at a particular
time (which we call ttaken). We will proceed to analyze this step.
Note that transitions only get added to processes’ TrC values and no TrC ever
has a transition removed from it. Therefore, for the algorithm to halt, there should
exist a time (which we call thalt), when the TrC of all processes stop changing.
We define TrCHi to be the value of process pi’s TrC at thalt.
We assume TS = {Trα1 , T rα2 , T rα3 , . . . , T rαk} to be the list of the k outgo-
ing transitions of qc sorted by their enabling time in increasing order. Therefore,
Trα1 = Trtaken, and the transitions that never get enabled are placed at the end
of the list. We now prove by induction, that at thalt, there exists a process with
all the transitions of TS in its TrC list, and hence, it can conclude the automaton
location change. We define the induction hypothesis P (m) as follows:
P (m) = At thalt, there exists a process containing all transitions
Trα1 , T rα2 , T rα3 , . . . , T rαm in its TrC.
⇒ P (m) = ∃i s.t. {Trα1 , T rα2 , T rα3 , . . . , T rαm} ⊆ TrCHi
Base Case: P (1) holds
∃i s.t. Trα1 ∈ TrCHi
This is obvious, since Tr1 = Trtaken, and Trtaken eventually gets enabled, based
on the proof of soundness, its enabling time will be detected by its coordinator
and it will be added to the coordinator’s TrC.
Induction Step: If P (m) holds, then P (m+ 1) also holds
∃i s.t. {Trα1 , T rα2 , T rα3 , . . . , T rαm} ⊆ TrCHi
⇒ ∃j s.t. {Trα1 , T rα2 , T rα3 , . . . , T rαm+1} ⊆ TrCHj
If pi is not associated with Trαm+1 ’s predicate, the last time its TrC value
changes, it sends an Aggregate message containing TrCHi in its TrC, and with
Trtaken as its Tre, to all processes associated with Trαm+1 ’s predicate. One of those
processes is Trαm+1 ’s coordinator, which upon receiving the Aggregate message,
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realizes that Trαm+1 was not enabled before Tre which is Trtaken. It then adds
Trαm+1 to its TrC list, which previously contained transitions Trα1 through Trαm
from the received Aggregate message.
If pi is associated with Trαm+1 ’s predicate, the last time its TrC value changes,
it sends an Aggregate message containing TrCHi in its TrC, and with Trtaken as
its Tre, to all processes associated with Trαm+1 ’s predicate with a smaller tlu than
Trtaken. If one of those processes is Trαm+1 ’s coordinator, similar to the previous
case, the coordinator will end up with all transitions Trα1 through Trαm+1 in its
TrC.
If none of those processes are Trαm+1 ’s coordinator, that means they have
passed Delegate messages along, until the coordinator became one of the pro-
cesses that didn’t previously receive the Aggregate message. That process’s tlu is
bigger than Trtaken’s enabling time. That means the previous coordinator (which
received the Aggregate message) now has all of its tlu values to be greater than
Trtaken’s enabling time, so upon receiving the Aggregate message, it can conclude
that Trαm+1 was not enabled before Trtaken. It then adds Trαm+1 to its TrC list,
resulting in it containing transitions Trα1 through Trαm+1 .
Conclusion: P (k) holds; At thalt, there exists a process with all outgoing transitions
of qc in its TrC list, proving the algorithm’s completeness.
6 Experimental Results
We have fully implemented our algorithm, and ran it in a simulated distributed
environment. To evaluate our method, we have also implemented a centralized
runtime verification algorithm, where each process sends any update in its local
state to a central monitor. The following properties are checked in our experiments:
– φ1 is an extended version of our main example throughout the paper: “At some
point, the leader arrives at the destination. It then stays there until all k followers
have also arrived”. φ1 = ¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bk))
– φ2 = “The leader is at the destination and stays there until all k followers have
also arrived” = a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bk)
– φ3 = “Eventually, the leader and all the k followers arrive at the destination”
= ♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bk)
– And finally, the property used as the main example in [16]: φ4 = (a⇒ (b∪c))
The monitor automatons for the first three properties is depicted below in Figs 11,
12 and 13:
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q0start q1
q>
q⊥
a ∧ ¬b1
a ∧ ¬b2
. . .
a ∧ ¬bk
b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bk
b 1
∧ b
2
∧ ·
· · ∧
b k
¬
a ∧ ¬
b
1
¬
a ∧ ¬
b
2. . .¬
a ∧ ¬
b
k
Fig. 11 The monitor automaton for the LTL property φ1 = ¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bk))
q0start
q>
q⊥
b 1
∧ b
2
∧ ·
· · ∧
b k
¬
a ∧ ¬
b
1
¬
a ∧ ¬
b
2. . .¬
a ∧ ¬
b
k
Fig. 12 The monitor automaton for the LTL property φ2 = a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bk))
q0start q>
b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bk
Fig. 13 The monitor automaton for the LTL property φ3 = ♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bk)
φ1, φ2 and φ3 are tested for k = 2, k = 3, k = 4, . . . , k = 10 (where k is
the number of followers). All properties may result in satisfaction or violation
of the property, except for φ3, which can never be violated, and φ4, which can
never be satisfied. We ran an experiment for each possible outcome in {>,⊥, ?}.
So, we had a total of 27 experiments involving φ1 (9 for φ1 |= > for different
values of k ∈ {2, 3, 4, . . . , 10}, 9 for φ1 |= ⊥, and 9 for φ1 |= ?), 27 experiments
for φ2, 18 experiments for φ3, and 2 experiments for φ4, resulting in a total of 74
experiments. 600 randomized traces were generated for each of the 74 experiments.
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Property Min. α Avg. α Max. α
¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b10)) 0.479 2.236 16.831
¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b9)) 0.585 2.412 10.905
¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b8)) 0.668 2.651 13.028
¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b7)) 0.896 2.959 11.318
¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b6)) 1.132 3.312 15.331
¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b5)) 1.549 3.761 14.638
¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ b3 ∧ b4)) 2.085 4.310 14.644
(a⇒ (b ∪ c)) 2.059 4.685 6.138
¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ b3)) 2.961 4.983 12.879
¬a ∪ (a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2)) 4.753 6.272 12.514
a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2) 8.024 11.393 15.639
a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ b3) 7.120 12.464 19.659
♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2) 7.883 13.377 20.423
a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ b3 ∧ b4) 5.685 13.551 24.625
a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b5) 4.326 14.481 29.266
♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ b3) 8.048 15.321 25.511
a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b6) 3.092 15.422 33.645
a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b7) 2.248 16.490 39.651
♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ b3 ∧ b4) 8.483 17.367 28.722
a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b8) 1.641 17.554 44.043
a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b9) 1.221 18.619 49.408
♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b5) 8.385 19.479 35.186
a ∪ (b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b10) 0.928 19.903 55.395
♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b6) 8.186 21.738 40.159
♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b7) 8.689 23.983 46.116
♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b8) 8.153 26.456 52.295
♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b9) 8.801 28.900 55.640
♦(a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ b10) 8.373 31.495 60.571
Table 1 Improvement in message efficiency for our different input properties
The traces were generated following a Poisson distribution over a range of 100 time
units, 200 of the random traces were generated with the distribution’s µ = 10, 200
with µ = 100, and 200 with µ = 1000. Message delays were assigned a random
value in [0, 2). We checked the value α, defined as the ratio of messages sent if a
centralized algorithm had verified the property, to the number of messages sent
by our algorithm. This value is the improvement ratio of our algorithm in terms of
message efficiency.
Based on our experiments, the value of α was independent from µ, or the
properties truthfulness value, it only depended on the input itself. As observable
in table 1, properties of the first type have the least average improvement, since
multiple transitions (¬a ∧ ¬b1, ¬a ∧ ¬b2, . . . ), all with a high chance of getting
enabled, exit from the same automaton location, resulting in multiple Delegate
messages being sent for each. This is while properties of the third type show the
highest average improvement ratio, and in some cases, up to 60 fold fewer messages
transferred, since only one transition has to be checked: a ∧ b1 ∧ b2 ∧ · · · ∧ bk.
7 Related Work
A number of algorithms have been proposed for runtime verification in distributed
systems. The authors in [6] and [7] provide runtime verification algorithms for
26 M. Ali Dorosty et al.
MTL properties, and its extension with freeze quantifiers. These algorithms are
both centralized, where all processes send their updates via messages to one or
more central monitors that are responsible for checking the final verdict. Our
work focuses on a distributed solution, which can decrease the number of required
messages.
The algorithms introduced in [10,11,12] focus on runtime verification of LTL
properties in synchronous systems, where all the processes in the system experience
local state updates at pre-defined fixed time points. These time points are also
referred to as synchronous rounds. The synchrony allows processes to communicate
based on the i’th global state in the system. We focus on asynchronous systems,
where we cannot have any assumptions on synchrony of updates in different pro-
cesses.
Mostafa et al. in [16] propose a distributed runtime verification algorithm for
LTL properties in asynchronous systems. In the absence of a global clock, their
algorithm cannot determine the total order of events, and hence, it can only provide
us with possibilities of satisfaction/violation of properties, based on the different
permutations of the total order of events. In this paper, we use the assumption
of having a global clock, which is utilized to identify the order of events, and
deterministically identify the satisfaction/violation of the monitored properties.
Some approaches define their own property definition languages, with syntaxes
defined specifically for runtime verification. As an example, [8] defines a language
called pt-DTL, and [9] defines the extended version of that, called DTL. Both
of these languages are introduced for distributed systems, and their specifications
involve processes’ views of the system, namely what each process knows about other
processes. These languages, while intuitive, are not as expressive as LTL.
Part of our algorithm for detecting the satisfaction of a predicate is inspired
from the methodology used in [17]. We added timing to that algorithm, and used
it as a basis for our Delegate messages, which are used to detect the satisfac-
tion of transitions’ predicates. The closest algorithm to our proposed approach is
introduced by Falcone et al. in [13]. They propose a decentralized runtime veri-
fication algorithm for automata using global clocks. The algorithm enhances the
given automaton with more states and transitions, and for each automaton lo-
cation change, it requires passing a message between all processes in a circular
fashion. Obviously, their algorithm needs significantly more messages compared to
our approach. Based on their reported results, their algorithm is often less than 1.5
times more efficient than a purely centralized algorithm, in terms of the number
of messages passed. As mentioned in Section 6, we have achieved up to 60 times
less messages compared to a centralized solution.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a decentralized algorithm for runtime verification of
LTL properties (or any property describable by a DFA), with significant efficiency
in terms of the number of messages passed in the system. Each process has a mon-
itor that communicates with other monitors to identify the location changes in the
given DFA. The main goal of monitors is to detect among the outgoing transitions
of the current DFA location, the one with the earliest triggering predicate. We
prove that our algorithm is both sound and complete. We have implemented our
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algorithm, along with the centralized solution, and our experiments show that our
decentralized solution can achieve up to 60 times fewer messages compared to the
centralized one.
As for the future work, we plan to introduce time in the property specification,
resulting in a timed automaton with clocks in its transition’s predicates. We also
plan to propose an efficient runtime verification algorithm for these properties in
a real-time distributed system.
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